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Abstract - De-Identification is a process which can be used 
to ensure privacy by concealing the identity of individuals 
captured by video surveillance systems. One important 
challenge is to make the obfuscation process reversible so 
that the original image/video can be recovered by persons in 
possession of the right security credentials. This work 
presents a novel Reversible De-Identification method that 
can be used in conjunction with any obfuscation process. 
The residual information needed to reverse the obfuscation 
process is compressed, authenticated, encrypted and 
embedded within the obfuscated image using a two-level 
Reversible Watermarking scheme. The proposed method 
ensures an overall single-pass embedding capacity of 
1.25 bpp, where 99.8% of the images considered required 
less than 0.8 bpp while none of them required more than 
1.1 bpp. Experimental results further demonstrate that the 
proposed method managed to recover and authenticate all 
images considered. 
I. INTRODUCTION
Video surveillance cameras are becoming ubiquitous 
in many developed countries. This has raised several 
privacy concerns which have pushed policy makers to 
regulate their use. One approach to provide privacy is to 
obfuscate sensitive regions within an image/video which 
prevents the identification of the persons being captured.
The authors in [1,2] have proposed an irreversible 
obfuscation method which however, prevents the use of 
the captured videos from aiding criminal investigation or 
to be used as evidence in court [3]. 
Reversible De-Identification is a process which, while 
still concealing the identity of individuals, enables persons 
in possession of high security credentials to recover the 
original multimedia content containing private 
information. The authors in [4] encode the region of 
interest (ROI) and background in separate data layers 
using JPEG2000. On the other hand, the authors in [5,6] 
employ encryption strategies directly on the pixel 
intensities of the ROI. However, these methods 
completely destroy the naturalness of the captured video. 
 A ROI transform-domain scrambling technique was 
presented in [7,8,9] for different image/video compression 
standards. The scrambling process better maintains the 
naturalness of the video. However this method is less 
secure since it reveals the intensity levels of the original 
content. Moreover, the obfuscation and reversibility 
processes are dependent on each other, and thus cannot be 
used in conjunction with other obfuscation methods. Non-
reversible watermarking was adopted in [3,10] to solve the 
latter issue and embed the information needed to recover 
the De-Identified region within the video itself. However, 
both these schemes are irreversible since the noise 
introduced by the watermark embedding process is 
permanent. Moreover, these schemes have registered a 
substantial reduction in compression efficiency. The 
authors in [11] employ reversible watermarking to solve 
the former issue. However, this method induces 
significant distortions within the obfuscated image 
themselves. 
This work presents a Reversible De-Identification 
method for lossless images. This approach adopts 
Reversible Watermarking to make the system reversible.
The proposed solution is completely independent from the 
obfuscation process, and is thus generic. Nonetheless, this 
work employs the k-Same obfuscation process, which 
ensures k-anonymity, to obfuscate the face of frontal 
images. The difference between the original and 
obfuscated image is compressed, authenticated, encrypted 
and embedded within the obfuscated image itself. This 
method keeps the naturalness of the obfuscated images 
while the original image can only be recovered by 
individuals having the proper encryption key. The 
Reversible Watermarking schemes adopted in this work 
were found to outperform existing state-of-the-art 
schemes. Furthermore, experimental results demonstrate 
that the proposed scheme can recover and authenticate all
obfuscated images considered. 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides 
a high-level description of the proposed system and 
introduces the notation used in the latter sections. The 
Forward and Inverse Reversible De-Identification 
processes are explained in more detail in sections III and 
IV with the experimental results delivered in section V.
The final comments and concluding remarks are drawn in 
section VI. 
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Fig. 1 illustrates the schematic diagram of the 
Forward Reversible De-Identification process which 
receives the original image I and conceals the face of the 
person using the Face Obfuscation process to generate an 
obfuscated image Iϴ. This work considers color images 
using the YCbCr color space. The coordinates of the top 
left corner and bottom right corner of the De-identified 
region is enclosed within the bounding box β, which is 
passed to both ROI Extraction processes to extract the 
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face image F and the obfuscated face image Fϴ. The face 
images are then subtracted to derive the difference face 
image D.
The Payload Generator process is then used to 
convert the difference face image D and bounding box β
into a  packet pea which is authenticated and encrypted.  
The packet pea is then embedded within the obfuscated 
image Iϴ using the Integer Wavelet Transform  (IWT) 
Reversible Watermark Embedding process (1st level) 
which generates the embedded image IθW, the auxiliary 
information A and the residual bitstream e. This method 
provides a good compromise between capacity and 
distortion. However, additional information might be 
needed at the receiver to resolve overflow and underflow 
issues. The Reversible Contrast Mapping Embedding 
process (2nd level) is therefore used to embed this 
information (A and e) within the embedded image IθW,
which usually corresponds to few bits, and generates the 
second level embedded obfuscated image ÎθW. This 
method is ideal since it does not need additional 
information to resolve overflow/underflow issues. 
Moreover, the distortions introduced at low bitrates is 
generally negligible. However, its performance 
significantly degrades at higher bitrates and is therefore 
not suitable to embed large payloads. 
Fig. 2 depicts the schematic diagram of the Inverse 
Reversible De-Identification process. The second order 
embedded obfuscated image ÎθW is inputted to the 
Reversible Contrast Mapping Extraction process which 
extracts the first level embedded obfuscated image IθW
together with the auxiliary information A and the residual 
bitstream e. The IWT Reversible Watermark Extraction 
process is then used to extract the original payload pea and 
original obfuscated image Iϴ. The Inverse Payload 
Generator reverses the process of the Payload Generator
and recovers the difference image D and the bounding 
box β, which is used by the ROI Extractor process to 
extract the obfuscated face Fϴ. The difference image D
and obfuscated face Fϴ are then summed to derive the 
original face F, which is used by the ROI Replacement
process to recover the original image Irec. 
It is important to notice at this stage that the packet pea
is authenticated and encrypted, and therefore the 
difference image D and bounding box β can only be 
recovered correctly by persons in possession of the 
correct security key. The embedding processes are chosen 
in order to provide minimal distortion so that it maintains 
the naturalness of the obfuscated image. Moreover, the 
authentication process ensures that the original image is 
recovered and ensures that the image is not modified.
III. FORWARD REVERSIBLE DE-IDENTIFICATION
A. Face Obfuscation 
The Face Obfuscation process receives the original 
image I and detects the face region and eye locations 
using the ground truth information available in the color 
FERET dataset. This can be automated using the face 
detector in [12] and the eye detector in [13] which ensure 
high accuracies. However, the main contribution of this 
work is to present a Reversible De-Identification method 
which is independent from the obfuscation process. Thus, 
the automation of the face and eye detectors is not in the 
scope of this work.
The upper left and bottom right coordinates of the 
face region are included in the bounding box β and used 
to extract the face F which is aligned using affine 
transformations [14]. The aligned face image F is then 
concealed using the k-same algorithm, which computes 
the average face derived over the k closest aligned faces 
in Eigen-space, to generate the obfuscated aligned face 
image Fϴ. More information on the k-same algorithm can 
be found in [2]. The obfuscated face image Fϴ is then re-
aligned to match the orientation of the original face image 
F using affine transformations and then overwrites the 
face region in the original image I to derive the 
obfuscated image Iϴ.
B. ROI Extraction 
The ROI Extraction process is a simple algorithm 
which employs the bounding box coordinates β to 
identify the region to be cropped from the input image I
(or Iϴ). The cropped sub-image is then stored in the face 
image F (or obfuscated face image Fϴ). 
C. Payload Generator 
The Payload Generator Process receives the 
difference image D which is compressed using the 
predictive coding method presented in [15] followed by 
the Deflate algorithm [16]. The original image I is 
authenticated using SHA-1 which generates a 20-Byte 
Hash. The Hash will be used by the Inverse Reversible 
De-Identification process to ensure that it recovers the 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the Forward Reversible De-
Identifcation Process
Figure 2. Schematic diagram of the Inverse Reversible De-Identifcation 
Process
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original image I, and is thus appended to the Payload. The 
bounding box coordinates β are also required at the 
receiver to identify the face region and are therefore 
included as information within the header. The resulting 
packet pa, illustrated in Fig. 3, was then encrypted using 
AES-128 to generate the encrypted packet pea. 
D. IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding 
The IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding
process first derives the number of decompositions Ndec
needed to embed the packet pea within Iϴ using   
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where represents the cardinality of the set, W and H
represent the number of columns and rows in the image 
and Ch represents the number of color channels (in our 
case 3). This process then adopts the CDF(2,2) integer 
wavelet transform specified in [17] to decompose the 
image. This method employs Forward Integer Wavelet 
Expansion to embed the actual information while a novel 
Threshold Selection strategy is used to identify the set of 
thresholds which provide enough capacity while 
minimize the overall distortions. More information is 
provided in the following subsections. 
1) Threshold Selection 
The proposed Threshold Selection method is based on 
the observation that different sub-bands provide different 
levels of distortions [18]. However, in order to reduce the 
complexity of the optimization function, the following 
assumptions were made 
 The chrominance sub-bands have similar 
properties and thus share the same threshold. 
 The HL and LH sub-bands  within the same 
color channel (luminance or chrominance) are 
assumed to have similar characteristics and therefore 
have the same threshold.  
The number of thresholds to be considered by the 
Threshold Selection process is given by 
 decT NN  12 
In order to clarify this, consider a single level of 
decomposition. In this case NT = 4 where T1 is the 
threshold for coefficients in sub-band HH1 of the 
luminance component, T2 is the threshold for coefficients 
in sub-band HL1 and LH1 of the luminance component, 
T3 is the threshold for coefficients in sub-band HH1 in the 
chrominance components (Cb and Cr) and T4 is the 
threshold for coefficients in sub-bands HL1 and LH1 in 
the chrominance components. Note that the subscript for 
the sub-bands represents the level of decomposition. The 
thresholds corresponding to sub-bands at higher level of 
decomposition are considered to be the same for the same 
color component. Therefore, if we consider a second 
level of decomposition (NT = 6), the additional threshold 
T5 controls the coefficients in sub-bands HH2, HL2 and 
LH2 for the luminance component while threshold T6 is 
responsible for the coefficients in sub-bands HH2, HL2
and LH2 for the chrominance components. The same 
happens for higher levels of decompositions. 
One naive approach is to use exhaustive search to find 
the optimal set of thresholds. However, this has a time 
complexity of the order of O(nNT) where n represents the 
search range. An alternative approach is to use a meta-
heuristic approach to solve this optimization problem. 
This work employs Differential Evolution (DE) [19],
which is a population based optimization algorithm, to 
derive the set of threshold which minimize a distortion 
criterion while ensuring that the capacity of the proposed 
system is sufficient to embed the message s. The time 
complexity provided by this scheme is of the order of 
O(G×NP×NT), where NP is the population size and G
corresponds to the number of generations. 
Differential Evolution starts with a random set of 
possible solutions and tries to find better solutions 
through mutation and cross-over. The set of potential 
thresholds Δ is a list of threshold NP vectors which are 
initialized using a uniformly distributed random number 
generator. The threshold vectors iΔT  which do not 
provide enough capacity are pruned and replaced by 
another random vector which satisfies it. The population 
of thresholds evolves over a number of generations using 
mutation and cross-over. The mutation process generates 
a mutant vector for every threshold vector contained 
within the population of NP vectors using 
 321 rrri ΔΔΔv   
where {r1,r2,r3}  [0,NP-1] are mutually different 
integers which are different from index i, while α is a 
mutation factor that controls the magnitude of the 
differential variation. The cross-over process is then used 
to increase the diversity of the mutated vectors, and are 
included in another list of potential thresholds 
iΔ according to 
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where  is a uniformly distributed random number [0,1] 
and  represents the cross-over probability which has a 
constant value. The potential thresholds vectors iΔ which 
do not provide enough capacity are pruned from the list. 
The initial threshold vectors iΔ and mutated threshold 
vectors iΔ are then used to embed the bitstream s, where 
each time the threshold set T is included in the header of 
s (see Fig. 4). The distortion between the obfuscated 
image Iϴ and the resulting expanded obfuscated image IθW
is computed using the weighted Peak Signal-to-Noise 
Figure 3. The authenticated packet pa.
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Ratio (wPSNR) and is used to represent the fitness of the 
threshold T [20]. The NP threshold vectors which have 
the largest fitness values from the two sets are then 
grouped to replace the initial set Δ . The iterative process 
is terminated when either the maximum number of 
generations Gmax is reached or else when the difference 
between the largest and smallest wPSNR within the list of 
thresholdsΔ is smaller than some constant Φ. 
2) Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion 
The Forward Integer Wavelet Expansion process 
receives the set of thresholds T which are derived by the 
Threshold Selection process and encapsulates the packet 
pea shown in Fig. 3 to generate the packet s to be 
embedded (Fig. 4). The field Ndec is a 
 

M2log  bit field 
which specifies the number of decompositions used by 
the embedding process, T is a variable length field which 
specifies the threshold adopted (8-bit per threshold) and L
is a 10-bit field which specifies the cardinality of pea in 
bytes. This information is inserted as header information 
since the decoder needs it to reverse the process. 
The packet s is inserted within the high frequency 
sub-bands of the integer wavelet coefficients. During the 
embedding process, a wavelet coefficient wµ,j in sub-band 
µ is selected at random following a random permutation 
generated using the encryption key. A wavelet coefficient 
wµ,j is considered for embedding if its magnitude is 
smaller than the threshold responsible of sub-band µ. A 
bit b is embedded using 
bww jj   ,, 2
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The other wavelet coefficients are not considered for 
embedding. However, in order to prevent ambiguities at 
the receiver, they are expanded using 








 Otherwise1T
0 ifT
,
,,
,



j
jj
j w
ww
w  
where Tµ is the threshold responsible for sub-band µ.This 
process is terminated once all the bits in s are embedded. 
In the rare event where this process fails to embed all 
bits, these bits are stored in a bit-sequence e. The 
expanded obfuscated image IθW is then obtained using the 
inverse integer wavelet transform. The coordinates of 
pixels which encounter underflow/overflow issues and 
their corresponding values are included within the list of 
auxiliary information A.  
E. Reversible Contrast Mapping 
The only problem with the proposed Forward Integer 
Wavelet Expansion process is that sometimes A and e are 
not empty. This work adopts the syntax shown in Fig. 5 to 
represent this information r to be embedded. The Flag is a 
2-bit field which indicates whether A and e are empty or 
not. In case that one of them (or both) are not empty, the 
number of bits needed to embed the information in A (or 
e) is signaled in NA (or Ne). The fields NA and Ne are 
encoded using 8-bits each while the size of A and e are 
variable length. 
This work adopts the Reversible Contrast Mapping 
(RCM) [21] to embed the packet r within the watermarked 
obfuscated image IθW. The main advantage of using RCM 
is that it embeds all information within the image without 
any ambiguities and provides an additional capacity of 
0.5 bpp. However, the main limitation of the RCM is its
limited capacity and that the distortion can become 
significant when embedding large payloads. However, the 
packet size r is expected to be very low (generally 2-bits). 
The forward RCM transforms two neighboring pixel 
pairs (x, y) into (x', y') using 
xyyyxx  2' ,2' !
To prevent overflow and underflow, the transform is 
restricted to a sub-domain defined by the pixels which 
satisfy the conditions 
25520 ,25520  xyyx "
The RCM scheme replaces the least significant bits 
(LSBs) of the transformed pairs (x', y'). The LSB of x' is 
used to indicate whether information is embedded within 
y' or not. A value of '1' indicates that information is
embedded while a value of '0' can indicate two things. It 
can be that both pixel pair values (x, y) were odd or else 
that the pair are ambiguous and cannot be used for 
embedding. In the former case, the information bit is still 
embedded within the LSB of y'. On the other hand, the 
latter case cannot be used to embed information and thus 
the LSB of y' is not changed, while the true value of the 
LSB of x is inserted within the bit-sequence being 
embedded. More information about the RCM scheme can 
be found in [21].
IV. INVERSE REVERSIBLE DE-IDENTIFICATION
A. Reversible Contrast Mapping Extraction 
The Reversible Contrast Mapping Extraction process 
receives the image ÎθW and recovers IθW and r. The 
information bit can be extracted from the LSB of y' when 
the LSB of x' is '1'. However, in the event when the LSB 
of x' is '0', both LSBs of x' and y' are forced to be odd and 
condition (9) is checked. If the condition is satisfied it 
then represents an odd pixel pair while if it does not it 
indicates that y = y' and the original LSB value of x is 
extracted from the bitstream. More information about this 
is available in [21]. The auxiliary information A and 
residual bitstream e are then extracted from the packet r.
The original pixel values are recovered using 
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Figure 4. The actual bit stream to be embedded s.
Figure 5. The packet r to be embedded within IθW.
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B. IWT Reversible Watermarking Extraction 
The IWT Reversible Watermarking Extraction reverses 
the IWT Reversible Watermarking Embedding process and 
extracts the payload information pea and the original 
obfuscated image Iϴ. It must be noted here that initially, 
the decoder has no knowledge about the number of 
decompositions employed Ndec and the threshold values T.
The decoder thus assumes that a single decomposition is 
employed and that the threshold values are set to zero. 
These values are then updated once they are extracted 
from the header information of s. It is important that the 
encoder does the same thing during embedding in order to 
ensure synchronization between the encoder and decoder.   
The watermarked obfuscated image IθW is then 
decomposed into Ndec levels using the CDF(2,2) integer 
wavelet transform and the wavelet coefficients of the high 
frequency sub-bands are scanned using the random 
permutation index generated using the encryption key. 
The bits of the packet are extracted from coefficients 
which satisfy the condition jjj TwT ,,, 212  
 and 
are extracted from the LSB of jw ,
 while the original 
wavelet coefficient is recovered using 
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The remaining coefficients are not used for embedding 
and are recovered using 
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This method terminates once all the L bytes are 
extracted. The resulting image is then inverse CDF(2,2) 
transformed to recover the original obfuscated image Iϴ.
The auxiliary information (if any) is then used to recover 
ambiguous pixel values while the residual bitstream e (if 
any) is appended to the recovered payload.  
C. ROI Replacement 
The ROI Replacement process replaces the region 
marked by the bounding box β with the recovered face 
image F. The image Irec can be authenticated by 
comparing the hash derived by computing the SHA-1 on
Irec to the Hash value present in the tail of the packet pa.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
The results presented in this section consider two 
different sets of images. The first set was composed of 
the standard test images Lena, Barbara, Aircraft and 
Mandrill while the second set consisted of 2000 frontal 
images from the color FERET dataset. All images 
considered in this work were converted in the YCbCr
color space using 4:4:4 sampling. The standard test 
images were used to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed Threshold Selection process while the frontal 
images were used to evaluate the whole system. 
The proposed algorithm has set the maximum number 
of decompositions M to 3 which ensures a single pass 
embedding capacity offered by the first level of 
watermarking of 0.9844 bpp. The Difference Expansion 
method was configured using values suggested in [19] 
and thus adopted α = 0.5, NP  = 100 and Γ = 0.3. This 
paper does not claim that this corresponds to an optimal 
configuration, but claims that it provides performance 
superior to state of the art IWT threshold selection 
schemes such as [17] (see Fig. 6). These results clearly
demonstrate that the proposed scheme manages to 
provide better quality of the stego image IθWat different 
capacities. Simulation results further demonstrate that the 
proposed scheme needs on average 20 generations to 
converge. This correspond to 2000 invocations of the 
fitness function which is significantly less than the 255NT
invocations needed by exhaustive search. 
Fig. 7  demonstrates the cumulative density function 
(CDF) of the capacity needed to embed packet s within 
the obfuscated image using the set of 2000 frontal images 
from the color FERET dataset. It can be seen that a 
capacity smaller than 0.8 bpp is needed 99.8% of the time 
while they never require more than 1.1 bpp. It must be 
mentioned that the proposed scheme has a single-pass 
embedding capacity close to 1.25 bpp and is thus able to 
embed the information necessary to recover all images 
considered in this test. It is important to mention here that 
frontal images represent a very difficult scenario for our 
system since the area covered by the ROI is large in 
relation to the background. Lower capacities are expected 
when considering common surveillance scenarios. 
Simulation results further demonstrate that the residual 
bitstream e was empty for 99.8% of the time and the 
Auxiliary information A was empty for 99.85% of the 
time. This result confirms that most of the time the RCM 
reversible watermarking scheme embeds just 2-bits 
within the obfuscated image. Moreover, the additional 
capacity needed in these circumstances was at most 
0.015bpp, which is very small and provides negligible 
distortions. 
The images in Fig. 8 demonstrate the superiority of 
the proposed method in relation to other state of the art 
methods. It can be seen that the encryption [5] and 
scrambling [8] processes provide images which are not 
natural. Moreover, it can be seen that the reversible de-
identification process presented in this work, which 
embeds the information using  reversible watermarking, 
manages to keep the image natural. It is important to 
Figure 6. Rate-Distortion performance using different Threshold 
Selection methods for (a) Aircraft, (b) Barbara, (c) Lena and (d) 
Mandrill test images.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
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notice that the person de-identified using k-same is not 
recognizable from his facial features since eyes, nose and 
mouth features are modified and that the distortion 
introduced by the watermark is almost negligible. This 
work can be extended to other soft biometrics, such as 
hear. The system was also tested using erroneous 
encryption keys at the receiver. In all tests conducted the 
receiver failed to recover the original image when the 
wrong encryption key is used. 
VI. CONLUSION
This work presents a novel Reversible De-
Identification method for lossless compressed images. The 
proposed scheme is generic and can be employed with 
other obfuscation strategies other than k-Same. A two-
level Reversible-Watermarking scheme was adopted 
which uses Differential Evolution to find the optimal set 
of thresholds and provides a single-pass embedding
capacity close to 1.25 bpp. Simulation results have shown 
that this method is able to recover the original image if the 
correct encryption key is employed. It further shows that 
0.8 bpp were sufficient to cater for 99.8% of the frontal 
images considered and none of the image needed more 
than 1.1 bpp. Future work will focus on the extension of 
this algorithm for lossy image and video compression 
standards. 
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Figure 7. CDF of the capacity needed to embed s at different 
obfuscation levels (a) k = 2, (b) k = 5, (c) k = 10 and (d) k = 20.
Figure 8. Comparing the resulting reversible de-identified images (a) 
Original Image, (b) Scrambling of DCT coefficients [8], (c) Encryption 
of pixel values [5] and (d) proposed method.
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